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Plantinga' s Parity Thesis

Alvin Plantinga's epistemology of religion is no less complex
than Alston's. It can be divided into two parts. The first, both
historically and in the order I consider it here (this and the next
chapter), is Plantinga's development of the notion of the proper
basicality of beliefs; this is his clearest defense of the parity thesis.
In this context, Plantinga's chosen language is that of "epistemic
justification" and "rationality. " This is to be contrasted with the
second part of his epistemology, in which Plantinga develops and
defends his account of "epistemic warrant" or "positive epistemic
status. " There his concern is the quality, property, or thing,
enough of which converts mere true belief into knowledge. In the
essays and books in which he considers these issues, he does not
explicitly consider a parity thesis. Nevertheless, I discuss this as
pect of his epistemology in Chapter 9.
In defending his version of the parity thesis, Plantinga encour
ages us to reconsider epistemic foundationalism and its relationship
to theistic belief. He further urges us to reject evidentialism,
which, he claims, is rooted in a certain version of foundationalism.
In this chapter my initial concern is to introduce Plantinga's earlier
work on rationality, noting the major tenets of his understanding
of foundationalism as well as his arguments against evidentialism
and the particular foundationalist understanding of justification he
claims undergirds it. From this discussion emerges a description of
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Plantinga's version of the parity thesis. I then suggest a challenge
to it.
I. Foundationalism
Plantinga's general concern is whether belief in God, that is, the
belief "God exists, " can be (as opposed to is) rational. To show
how it can be rational, he tries to show how it can be "properly
basic" in a foundational system of justification. On Plantinga's ac
count, epistemological foundationalism is a normative view. 2 One
of its goals is to lay down conditions for rational belief. He writes:
"According to the foundationalist, there is a right way and a
wrong way with respect to belief. People have responsibilities, du
ties and obligations with respect to their believings just as with
respect to their (other) actions. " To be rational, then, "is to exer
cise one's epistemic powers properly-to exercise them in such a
way as to go contrary to none of the norms for such exercise. To
be rational, on this account, is something a person does; it has to
do with one's responsibility or, more broadly, one's following the
norms in epistemic matters. Having stated what it is to be rational,
of course, does not obviously clarify the related issue of epistemic
justification of belief. Here Plantinga is sometimes unclear. He ap
parently uses the terms "rational" and "irrational" interchangeably
with "justified" and "unjustified. " And his claims are, on the one
hand, about beliefs: beliefs are rational (or j ustified) . On the other
hand, he talks about rational noetic structures (or even simply of "be
ing rational, " as in the above quotation) . In the main, his concern
seems to be justified belief. We can, then, pass over the notion of
1

"3

1. Normally, Plantinga speaks not of the belief that God exists but of belief in
God. The latter is to be understood as the former. I follow Plantinga in this conve
nient shorthand. Also, as it turns out, the general concern for Plantinga is beliefs
about God and his activity (e.g., God's creation of the flowers), from which there
is an immediate inference to "God exists." Again, for convenience, I sometimes do
not distinguish between the belief that God exists and other theistic beliefs.
2. At least he thinks this in the account given in the Reformed epistemology
essays published between 1979 and 1985, the essays and ideas around which this
chapter is written.
3. Alvin Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology," Proceed
ings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 54 (1980): 49-62, quotation pp.
53-54·
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rationality iiberhaupt and concern ourselves with the justification or
propriety of beliefs. We can do this safely because Plantinga's com
ments about rationality are tied closely to his comments about jus
tification, both being normative notions and, presumably, the jus
tification of (most of) one's believings being at least necessary for
the rationality of one's noetic structure or more generally for one's
being (epistemically) rational.
First, then, some comments about Plantinga's notion of noetic
structure. He says: "A person's noetic structure is the set of propo
sitions he believes together with certain epistemic relations that
hold among him and these propositions. These relations include
the basis relation (that I believe p on the basis of q), the supports
relations (that one belief or set of beliefs provides evidential back
ing for another belief), and the propriety of beliefs (those that are
inferential are "properly nonbasic" only if appropriately based on
others, and those that are noninferential are "properly basic" only
if certain hard-to-specify conditions are met). Plantinga also men
tions strength of belief, depth of ingression, epistemic history, and
relations between belief and acceptance as candidates for important
aspects of noetic structures. Of all these aspects of noetic struc
tures, I concentrate on the notion of properly basic beliefs.
Plantinga notes various types of foundationalism and isolates
two in particular: classical (or strong) and weak. He writes: "Sup
pose we say that weak foundationalism is the view that (I) every
rational noetic structure has a foundation [i. e. , a set of properly
basic beliefs], and (2) in a rational noetic structure, non-basic belief
is proportional in strength to support from the foundations . " Clas
sical foundationalism, in contrast, consists of weak foundational
ism plus certain specified criteria for proper basicality. What are
those criteria? "Ancient and medieval foundationalists tended to
hold that a proposition is properly basic for a person only if it is
either self-evident or evident to the senses; modern foundational
ists-Descartes, Locke, Leibniz and the like-tended to hold that
a proposition is properly basic for S only if either self-evident or
incorrigible for S. "5 Plantinga sometimes identifies classical foun
dationalism as the disjunction of ancient and medieval with mod"4

4·
s.

Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 56-57.
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ern foundationalism, but he does not always do so. In places he
treats classical foundationalism simply as modern foundationalism.
Unless otherwise indicated, I use the term "classical foundational
ism" in the broader, disjunctive sense.
The belief that God exists is, of course, neither self-evident, nor
incorrigible, nor evident to the senses. If Plantinga is to show how
belief in God can be properly basic, he must show that classical
foundationalism is false. One of his goals is to accomplish that
task.
2. Evidentialism
By showing classical foundationalism to be false and arguing
that belief in God can be properly basic in some other foundational
system of justification, Plantinga may be able to show how belief
in God can be epistemically justified. But the so-called irrationality
(nonjustified status) of belief in God should not be seen simply as a
problem arising out of classical foundationalism. In a significant
way, says Plantinga, the charge of irrationality-that belief in God
is not justified-is rooted in "evidentialism" and can be generally
stated as the "evidentialist objection to theistic belief.
Evidentialism is the view represented by the following:
"6

(I) There are obligations or standards of excellence with re
spect to belief.
Additionally, Plantinga cites a claim of W. K. Clifford:7
(2) "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to be
lieve anything upon insufficient evidence. "
How are the obligations or standards of (1) to be understood? Plan
tinga's earliest Reformed epistemology essays suggest several dif6. Just as foundationalism is a normative thesis, so is evidentialism. Some of
Plantinga's claims about evidentialism are virtually identical to his claims about
foundationalism. See Plantinga, "The Reformed Objection to Natural Theology,"
p. 53, and "Reason and Belief in God," p. 30.
7. As quoted in Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 25; from W. K.
Clifford, "The Ethics of Belief," in Lectures and Essays, vol. 2, Essays and Reviews
(London: Macmillan Press, 1879), originally in Contemporary Review, 1877.
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ferent forms the obligations might assume, but he moves in a later
essay to a model employing the notion of standards rather than
obligations. The motivation for this shift need not concern us here. 8
But perhaps the following captures more of Plantinga's spirit in
characterizing evidentialism:
(2') It is either intellectually wrong or intellectually defective
for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.
We can understand (2') to be a more explicit expression of (2) .
Plantinga gives a list of evidentialists that includes Aquinas, Des
cartes, Locke, Blanshard, Russell, Scriven, Clifford, and Flew.
What common philosophical view is shared by this otherwise var
ied collection of philosophers? In part it is a view about the epi
stemic status that belief in God must have if it is justified. Follow
ing (1) and (2'), they all agree that
(3) It is irrational or unreasonable to accept theistic belief in
the absence of sufficient evidence or reasons.
Some evidentialists also hold a further claim:
(4) We have no evidence or at any rate not sufficient evidence
for the proposition that God exists.
9

Others do not. Here the evidentialist obj ection comes to the fore.
The objection is rooted in the alleged truth of claims (I), (2'), (3),
and (4) and concludes that belief in God is not justified. Thus, all
evidentialist obj ectors are evidentialists, but the converse is not
true. Evidentialism, then, is the view that minimally (I), (2'), and
(3) are true. The evidentialist obj ection is that evidentialism is true,
as is (4). Thus, the belief that God exists ought not to be held or is
noetically unfortunate, untidy, or substandard.
Plantinga disagrees with the evidentialist objector on at least two
8. For obligations, see, for example, Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God,"
pp. 3 r-34. For standards, see Plantinga, "Coherentism and the Evidentialist Ob
jection to Belief in God," in Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment:
New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Robert Audi and William J. Wain
wright (Ithaca, N. Y. : Cornell University Press, 1986), p. II r.
9. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 27.
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accounts. First, he thinks there is evidence for the belief that God
exists. Although this disagreement is important, I do not explore
it here. Second, he thinks evidence is not needed for justified belief
in God. The evidentialist responds that nothing is more reasonable
than (3); if there is no evidence or reason to believe in God, one
should not do so on pain of irrationality. But Plantinga does not
mean by his claim that no evidence whatsoever is needed for justi
fied belief in God. What he means by "reason" or "evidence" is not
simply justification in all its varied forms. Rather, he has in mind
discursive justification. We can say that a belief p is discursively
justified for some person S when S holds p because of some other
belief or beliefs she holds. Presumably, the truth of these other
beliefs is taken by S to make p's truth more likely than if they were
not true. Plantinga does not give a complete account of the rela
tionship between the justifying belief(s) and the j ustified belief, but
we can surmise that it must be some sort of inferential relationship.
Discursive j ustification does not include, then, noninferential justi
fication. It does not include justification where p is j ustified by
some sort of experience (e. g., my being appeared to in a certain
way) or by some feature of the proposition itself (e. g., self-evi
dence). Thus, in the typical case, the belief that 2 + 1 = 3 is not
discursively justified but held on the grounds of self-evidence.
When Plantinga speaks of evidentialists holding (3), he attributes to
them the view that belief in God must be discursively justified.
A problem with Plantinga's claims arises here. Claim (2') is that
evidence is needed for any belief to be intellectually nondefective or
intellectually permissible. If Plantinga understands evidence as dis
cursive justification and (2') is true, then every belief must be jus
tified by some other belief. Foundational models of justification
seem to be excluded. But I think this is simply a slip of the pen.
Plantinga need not attribute the stronger view to the evidentialist;
the evidentialist need not claim that all beliefs must be discursively
justified. She need only claim that beliefs that cannot be (or are
not) properly nondiscursive, as far as their justification is con
cerned, must be discursively justified. In fact, Plantinga claims, ev
identialism is rooted in classical foundationalism. Thus, the beliefs
10

ro. See, for example, the ontological argument in Plantinga, God, Freedom, and
Evil (Grand Rapids, Mich. : Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 85-II2.
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that are properly basic-those beliefs that are either self-evident,
incorrigible, or evident to the senses-need not be provided evi
dence in the way (2') demands. Claim (2') should be replaced by
(2*) It is either intellectually wrong or intellectually defective
for anyone to believe, on insufficient evidence, any belief
requiring discursive justification.
Naturally, if the evidentialist obj ector's challenge is to make sense,
the belief "God exists" must require discursive justification. Thus,
(3) should be replaced by
(3*) Since belief in God requires discursive justification, 1t 1s
irrational, unreasonable, or unjustified to accept theistic
belief in the absence of sufficient evidence or reasons.
Our corrected picture of evidentialism is that minimally {I),
(2*), and (3*) are true. The evidentialist obj ector believes not only
that evidentialism is true but that (4) is also true. Thus, belief in
God is irrational. Plantinga can now be seen as rejecting (3*) and
(4).
Despite Plantinga's disagreements with (3*) and (4), he does
think (I) is true. He writes that "it seems plausible to hold that
there are obligations and norms with respect to belief, and I do not
intend to contest this assumption."'' Extrapolating from his later
work, I assume he would no longer put forth this claim alone but
instead make appropriate modifications in light of the demands of
noetic excellence or nondefectiveness. 12 Thus, he would affirm
(I*) There are obligations, standards of excellence, or (other)
normative patterns to follow with respect to belief which,
when followed, provide permissive justification for a be
lief.
The evidentialist thus would hold (I*), (2*), and (3*), and the evi
dentialist obj ector would add (4).
r I. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 3 I.
12. Whether (2*) is something Plantinga believes is not clear. I presume he
would not obviously disagree, but I suspect he would be hesitant to say that there
is a class of beliefs whose members noetically demand discursive justification.
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Two aspects of Plantinga's thought deserve special attention.
First, his account of epistemic justification is an account of a nor
mative notion of epistemic justification. 13 Although he does not
spell out the details of the position, the notion ofjustification with
which he is concerned is in the neighborhood of permissive justi
fication, that is, what one is permitted to believe given that one has
done as much as can be expected vis-a-vis the normative require
ments for belief, whether those requirements are deontologically
based or otherwise. Second, he disagrees not only with the eviden
tialist objector but also with some of the claims of the evidentialist.
Not only is there discursive evidence for belief in God, but even
were there not, belief in 'God could nonetheless be justified. Al
though Plantinga holds that discursive justification for belief in
God can be given, it is not required for justification, at least in the
sense of permissive, normative justification. The evidentialist is
wrong; belief in God does not require discursive justification.
We are not yet in a position to state Plantinga's version of the
parity thesis. We do know that it involves a permissive, normative
notion ofjustification (not unlike Alston's Jnw• in some respects) . It
also includes some reference to the fact that theistic beliefs need not
be nonbasic but can be properly basic.
3.

The Failure of Classical Foundationalism

Plantinga argues in two ways against classical foundationalism. Let
us call these the "incoherence argument" and the "widespread belief
argument. " First, the incoherence argument. Plantinga captures clas
sical foundationalism's criteria for proper basicality in this way:14
(5) A proposition p is properly basic for a person S if and
only if p is either self-evident to S, incorrigible for S, or
evident to the senses for S.
On the classical foundationalist's view, not only is the disjunction
of the criteria sufficient for proper basicality, but it is necessary as
well. Plantinga's concern is with the necessity of the criteria.
13. He may hold other understandings of justification to be plausible as well.
And he certainly holds that normative justification and epistemic warrant are not
the same thing; see Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function,"
pp. 2-3·
14. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 59.
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According to classical foundationalism, says Plantinga, beliefs
are either properly basic, properly nonbasic, or not justified. Plan
tinga asks, of these alternatives, which is (5)? To be justified, (5)
must be either properly basic or properly nonbasic. If it is properly
basic it must be either self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the
senses. It is none of these. It must, then, be properly nonbasic. To
be properly nonbasic, (5) must be supported by a belief from the
foundation. Is it thus supported? It is not easy to see how. In sum
mary the challenge is this. If the statement of the criteria, that is,
(5), cannot be anchored, as it were, by its own expressed criteria,
how is it to be anchored? If it cannot be anchored on classical foun
dationalism's own grounds, it is either noetically substandard or
we ought not believe it. Classical foundationalism is self-referen
tially incoherent.
The widespread belief argument simply has it that, even were it
coherent to believe (5), such an account of epistemic justification
would make many of our beliefs unjustified. Plantinga has in mind
beliefs about the past and other minds. These follow neither de
ductively, inductively, nor on a probabilistic basis from the basic
beliefs allowed by (5) . This shows that (5) is false or at least un
justified, for surely many beliefs about other minds and the past are
justified. Here Plantinga's parity thesis begins to emerge, for the
development of a theory that allows us to hold that these wide
spread beliefs are justified leads to a theory that allows belief in
God to be justified on similar grounds. He concludes that, given
these two arguments, classical foundationalism is in poor shape. It
is not, according to Plantinga, a viable epistemic model for norma
tive, permissive justification.
15

4· Plantinga's Nonclassical, Normative
Foundationalism
The death of classical foundationalism does not signal the end of
all foundational models of justification; Plantinga remains a foun
dationalist. Two further points are relevant in this regard. First, a
beliefs being neither self-evident, incorrigible, nor evident to the
15. I believe he would add that classical foundationalism is not a viable epi
stemic model for many other kinds of justification as well, including that justifica
tion ("warrant") needed for knowledge.
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senses does not rule out its being properly basic. The rejection of
the classical criteria does not leave the foundationalist with no
where to turn. Having shown that the classical criteria do not pro
vide necessary conditions for proper basicality does not entail the
nonexistence of all criteria. Just as the critic of the verification prin
ciple of meaningfulness does not, on showing the principle false,
have to admit that there are no criteria for meaningfulness, Plan
tioga does not have to admit that there are no criteria for proper
basicality after rejecting the classical criteria.
Second, on rejecting a particular set of criteria for proper ba
sicality one need not have a replacement in order to recognize be
liefs as properly basic. One need not know what the criteria are in
order to recognize that some beliefs are properly basic. Also, one
need not know the criteria to recognize that something is not prop
erly basic. Again, just as the critic of the verification principle of
meaningfulness can know that "T'was brillig and the slithy toves
did gyre and gymble in the wabe" is not meaningful, the critic of
the classical criteria can know that some belief is not properly ba
sic, even though neither critic is able to replace the rejected criteria.
One can remain a foundationalist without an explicit account of
the criteria for foundational beliefs.
What of the criteria, then? Are there criteria necessary and suffi
cient for proper basicality? It is less than clear that there are, for
Plantinga's suggested method for discovering the criteria leads to a
much more open understanding of the role of criteria for proper
basicality than that provided by classical models of foundational
ism. He writes in this now oft-quoted passage that
the proper way to arrive at such a criterion is, broadly speaking,
inductive. We must assemble examples of beliefs and conditions such
that the former are obviously properly basic in the latter . . . . We
must then frame hypotheses as to the necessary and sufficient condi
tions of proper basicality and test these hypotheses by references
to those examples. Under the right conditions, for example, it is
clearly rational to believe that you see a human person before you: a
being who has thoughts and feelings, who knows and believes
things, who makes decisions and acts. It is clear, furthermore, that
you are under no obligation to reason to this belief from others you
hold; under those conditions that belief is properly basic for you.
But then (5) . . . must be mistaken; the belief in question, under
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those circumstances, is properly basic, though neither self-evident
nor incorrigible [nor evident to the senses] for you. Similarly, you
may seem to remember that you had breakfast this morning, and
perhaps you know of no reason to suppose your memory is playing
you tricks. If so, you are entirely justified in taking that belief as
basic. Of course it isn't properly basic on the criteria offered by
classical . . . foundationalists; but that fact counts not against you
but against those criteria.
Accordingly, criteria for proper basicality must be reached from
below rather than above; they should not be presented as ex Cathe
dra, but argued to and tested by a relevant set of examples. But there
is no reason to assume, in advance, that everyone will agree on the
examples. The Christian will of course suppose that belief in God is
entirely proper and rational; if he doesn't accept this belief on the
basis of other propositions, he will conclude that it is basic for him
and quite properly so. Followers of Bertrand Russell and Madelyn
Murray O'Hare may disagree, but how is that relevant? Must my
criteria, or those of the Christian community, conform to their ex
amples? Surely not. The Christian community is responsible to its
set of examples, not to theirs.
16

Rather than arbitrarily legislate the criteria for proper basicality, we
must inductively examine our noetic structures. On the basis of
what we take to be properly basic, we must come to agreement on
the criteria. If we disagree on which beliefs ought to be accepted as
properly basic, our criteria are different. This suggests that proper
basicality and its criteria are relative, in some way, person to per
son or community to community.
Plantinga continues by noting that criteria arrived at in the par
ticularistic way he suggests may not be polemically useful. If we
arrive at different criteria when using the inductive procedure, we
may not be able to use those criteria to reject another's examples of
properly basic beliefs. He wants to deny, however, that just any
belief can be properly basic. He says that in fact properly basic
beliefs stand in relation to the conditions in which they are formed,
and this relationship provides justification for properly basic be
liefs. Properly basic beliefs are not, says Plantinga, groundless.

16. Plantinga, "Is Belief in God Properly Basic?" Nous 15 (1981): 41-51, quota
tion p. so.
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It is tempting to raise the following sort of question. If belief in
God is properly basic, why cannot just any belief be properly basic?
Could we not say the same for any bizarre aberration we can think
of? What about voodoo or astrology? What about the belief that the
Great Pumpkin returns every Halloween? Could I properly take that
as basic? . . . If we say that belief in God is properly basic, will we
not be committed to holding that just anything, or nearly anything,
can properly be taken as basic, thus throwing wide the gates to irra
tionalism and superstition?
Certainly not. 17

One thing is clear: Plantinga wishes to reject a certain kind of arbi
trariness; he wants to reject an arbitrariness in which just any belief
can be properly basic, an arbitrariness in which a Great Pumpkin
belief is epistemically j ustified. So, not just any belief can be taken
as properly basic. A belief is properly basic only in certain circum
stances-only when it is grounded. But which circumstances pro
vide grounding?
Plantinga does not provide a formal account of the relationship
between beliefs and the conditions in which they are formed. He
instead provides some hints. I focus on two points. First, if one has
no reason to suspect that a belief is not justified, it is justified (or
perhaps, if one has no reason to doubt one's epistemic practice,
e. g., one's memory, the beliefs it generates are justified). Second,
if one has done all that can be expected epistemically with regard
to a belief, it is justified. Plantinga also provides the following ex
amples. He notes that the conditions in which the beliefs are
formed may be much more complex than the examples suggest,
but nonetheless "I see a tree" is properly basic if I am being appeared
to treely, "that person is in pain" is properly basic when I am aware
of that person displaying pain behavior, and "I had breakfast this
morning" is properly basic if I seem to remember having breakfast
this morning. Since these beliefs are not based on other beliefs, they
are basic. They are not, however, arbitrary or groundless.
18

19

I7. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 74·
I 8. One is tempted to call this arbitrariness "relativism," but that term is surely
a loaded one. To avoid much potential confusion, I continue in my use of the term
"arbitrary" (and its cognates).
I9. I refer to these as the "paradigms" of justified belief or as the "paradigms" of
properly basic beliefs; see Chapter I, Section 2.
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The circumstances vary the conditions in which a belief is prop
erly basic, but if a belief is properly basic there is a true proposition
of the sort:20
(6) In conditions C, S is justified in taking p as basic.
Certain kinds of conditions thus ground certain kinds of belief as
basic. The beliefs are justified by those conditions, although one
does not hold the beliefs on the basis of some other belief. Such
beliefs are nondiscursively justified or properly basic.
Some clarifications are possible here. First, surely some features
can be noted and agreed on which are necessarily shared by all
properly basic beliefs. For example, p is a properly basic belief only
if p is basic (not based on other beliefs) and proper (meets the con
ditions for the proper basicality of p) . These purely formal cri
teria-call them "formal" or "universal" criteria-are not, appar
ently, of concern to Plantinga.
A second level of criteria-call them "material" or "general" cri
teria-can be distinguished. Self-evidence, being evident to the
senses, and incorrigibility are examples. As Plantinga argues, these
examples are neither severally nor jointly necessary for proper ba
sicality. Any belief meeting one of these criteria, however, is prop
erly basic. It may well be possible to complete the set so that a
disjunction of these three criteria and some other criterion (or crite
ria) forms a set necessary for proper basicality. Meeting any mem
ber of the set (or combination of members of the set) would be
sufficient for proper basicality, but at least one of the set must be
met for a belief to be properly basic. This set, one might say, is the
instantiation of the formal criterion of propriety. To be properly
basic, a belief must meet at least one of the general criteria.
Finally, a third level of criteria can be distinguished-call them
"particular" criteria. My having the experience of what I take to be
a blue patch is an example of a particular criterion. This may be a
necessary condition of the proper basicality of the belief "I see a
blue patch, " although not for beliefs in general. Plantinga suggests
that my being appeared to redly is necessary and sufficient for the
proper basicality of the belief "I am appeared to redly. These are
"21

20. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God, " p. 79.
21. See ibid. , p. 77·
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the conditions in which "I am appeared to redly" is basic and prop
erly so. The conditions do vary from belief to belief, and perhaps
from moment to moment or person to person, but there nonethe
less are conditions for each properly basic belief which confer on
the belief the status of epistemic propriety. When one goes through
the inductive procedure to discover the conditions in which one's
basic beliefs are properly basic, it seems that the general criteria are
discovered only by considering the particular criteria. The general
criteria may then be inferred from whatever is shared in common
by sets of particular criteria for proper basicality. Plantinga uses the
term "criteria" to cover both what I have called material or general
criteria and particular criteria.
Thus Plantinga provides us with the outline of a nonclassical,
normative foundationalism. There are beliefs, both basic and non
basic. The former may be properly basic under certain conditions.
The discovery of those conditions is up to the community (or indi
vidual, as the case may be). The latter are, presumably, properly
nonbasic when appropriately based on other properly basic beliefs
or based on beliefs that are in turn based appropriately on properly
basic beliefs and so forth. In all cases, the propriety or appropriate
ness of the beliefs is a normative one.
22

5·

Proper Basicality, Theistic Beliefs, and the Parity
Thesis

Plantinga claims that with the collapse of classical foundation
alism the door is open to the possibility of belief in God being
properly basic. At least there is no reason to think that belief in
God cannot be. In fact, Plantinga's own version of foundationalism
is specifically designed to allow belief in God to be properly basic.
But is belief in God truly properly basic? Those in the tradition of
Reformed Christian theology answer affirmatively, says Plantinga,
and he enthusiastically concurs. He says little, however, about the
conditions that ground or justify belief in God as basic. He argues
that classical foundationalism is false but does not replace the crite
ria he rejects with his own. He claims instead that even without
23

22. I thank Bill Forgie for helpful discussion on these distinctions.
23. Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," p. 73.
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knowing the criteria for proper basicality one can know (in many
cases) which beliefs are and are not properly basic. The conditions
in which properly basic beliefs are provided grounding can thus be
discovered inductively. From these conditions one can discover the
criteria. Even though one does not know the conditions in which
belief in God is properly basic, it may nevertheless be properly
basic. The issue should not be decided without a close look at the
beliefs of religious believers.
Plantinga does suggest that belief in God is not groundless. He
compares it to grounded perceptual beliefs ("I see a tree"), memory
beliefs ("I remember eating breakfast this morning"), and beliefs
that ascribe mental states to other humans ("That person is in
pain"). These are the paradigm beliefs, as I suggested in Chapter I
that we call them. Plantinga argues that, in a manner analogous to
the grounding of these beliefs, "God exists" may be grounded.
Following Calvin, Plantinga holds that we have a disposition to
believe such things as "This flower was created by God" or "This
vast and intricate universe was created by God. On doing some
thing wicked I may form the belief "God disapproves of what I
have done." On reading the Bible one may feel compelled to be
lieve "God is speaking to me. " These conditions ground the beliefs
mentioned. Plantinga notes that none of these beliefs are, strictly
speaking, the belief that God exists. But again, strictly speaking,
what we are justified in believing is that "That person is in pain"
rather than that "That person exists. " We see no harm in ignoring
the one step, immediate inference from the former to the latter, so
it too is taken as properly basic. By analogy, there is no harm in
saying that the belief that God exists is properly basic, even though
there is a one step, immediate inference from the theistic claims
mentioned above to the belief that God exists. This immediate in
ference does not, presumably, provide anything more than a mini
mally complex sort of discursive evidence.
It is in this general context that Plantinga's parity thesis is most
clearly seen. The thesis emerges when he compares theistic beliefs
to paradigm beliefs, even though the comparison's role is not well
spelled out. Clearly enough, however, the comparison of (or anal
ogy between) the paradigm beliefs and theistic beliefs is no mere
"24

24. Ibid., p. So.
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convenience. It is a major tenet of Plantinga's position. As a first
account of Plantinga's parity thesis, let us say that, under appropri
ate conditions, S's belief that p, where p is a belief about God, has
the same nonclassical, normative justification as S's belief that p*,
where p * is a paradigm belief. Of course, the paradigm beliefs
should not be understood to be just the three examples mentioned,
but any beliefs of like kind. So theistic beliefs have, according to
Plantinga, at least the same kind of epistemic standing as many of
our commonly accepted nontheistic beliefs, insofar as permissive,
normative justification is concerned.
But, as with Alston's parity thesis, one must distinguish between
having the same kind of epistemic justification and having the
same level or strength of that kind. With Alston, it is clear that Jnw
is a weaker level of Jn than is Jn" and so it is evident that his con
'
cern is with level and kind. Alston also tells us that he is aiming at
the level of epistemic justification sufficient for "rational accep
tance. " But with Plantinga the issue is not so clear. Perhaps, how
ever, he means us to work with the notion of proper basicality
understood as a kind of j ustification, namely, noninferential nor
mative justification. It is natural then to suggest various levels
within that kind. Thus we can say that the level of justification
within the range of proper basicality is to be understood as the
same for both theistic and paradigm beliefs. But we need to con
sider potential overriding conditions. For example, although there
might be levels of strength of noninferential justification, they gen
erally have to do with special circumstances, such as that the night
is foggy rather than clear. The belief that there is a car ahead is
properly basic when held on a clear night. The belief that there is a
car ahead is also properly basic on a foggy night. But the former is
more strongly justified than is the latter even though both are
properly basic. (It might be two motorcycles, rather than a car. In
either case, it is time to get off the road . ) In this way, then, there
may be a range of strengths of justification within the category of
proper basicality; as well, some overriders may remove justifica
tion completely. To be clear about parity, we must allow for po
tential overriding conditions. Thus, given no special circum25

25. Plantinga also writes, at some length, about the defeasibility of properly
basic beliefs, noting that the justification that accrues to them is prima facie only.
This view meshes well with his normative account, as far as he has a developed
account, of justification; see ibid., pp. 83-85.
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stances, theistic beliefs and paradigm belief can have the same level
of justification-the strongest level-of the same kind ofjustifica
tion-noninferential normative proper basicality. Thus, a more ac
curate account of Plantinga's parity thesis is
Parity ThesisPiantinga (PTpJ): Under appropriate condi
tions, where no overriders are present, S's belief that p,
where p is a belief about God, has the same nonclassical
normative proper basicality (the strongest level) as S's be
lief that p *, where p * is a paradigm belief.
Thus PTPI is a broader claim than PTA• for it includes not only
perceptual beliefs, but memory beliefs and beliefs about other
minds as well. But both PTPI and PTA make claims not only about
the kind but also about the level of epistemic justification. They
differ, however, in that Alston's is a practice-based claim rather
than a belief-based claim.
Although Plantinga's discussion is broader than Alston's in that
Plantinga's parity thesis makes reference to memory beliefs and to
beliefs about other minds as well as to perceptual beliefs, it is easier
in some contexts to discuss Plantinga's thesis if we narrow its
scope. So consider a narrower version of PTp1:
Parity Thesis i>Iantinga (PTpJ): Under appropriate condi
tions, where no overriders are present, S's belief that p,
where p is a belief about God, has at least the same non26

26. Plantinga's more recent claims, in "Justification and Theism," Faith and Phi
losophy 4 (1987): 403-26, and "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function,"
point toward understanding positive epistemic status as the proper functioning of
one's epistemic equipment. In Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper
Function, he indicates his preference for the term "warrant" over "justification" for
that thing, enough of which, together with true belief, is sufficient for knowledge.
On that account, warrant is again a matter of proper functioning. The relationship
between positive epistemic status as a necessary condition of knowledge and posi
tive epistemic status as a condition of justification (in the normative sense being
considered here) is not clear or, perhaps, even important. Plantinga indicated, in
conversation, that his earlier work on Reformed epistemology asked the wrong
questions, if one is interested in knowledge, but that perhaps there are some as yet
uncovered relationships among knowledge, justification, and positive epistemic
status. He does reject various accounts of normative notions of justification as
necessary conditions of knowledge. It is thus difficult to know what to say about
the relationship of normative, permissive justification and positive epistemic status.
But then it is not clear that we need to have a position on the matter for the
purposes here. I make some futher comments on this topic in Chapter 9.
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classical normative proper basicality (the strongest level)
as S's belief that p*, where p* is a perceptual belief.

Since showing that the narrower thesis is false is sufficient for
showing the broader thesis false, I concentrate mostly on the nar
rower thesis. Hence, the majority of my discussion focuses on per
ceptual beliefs in comparison with theistic beliefs. I return later to
comment on memory beliefs and beliefs about other minds.
We now have Plantinga's parity thesis before us. In the remain
der of this chapter I present a challenge to it.
6.

The Universality Challenge Explained

Plantinga's central goal is the defense of PTPI· Since paradigm
beliefs can be properly basic, so can theistic beliefs. (For conve
nience, I speak simply of proper basicality rather than the strongest
level of proper basicality. ) I argue that PTPI or, more specifically,
PTl>1 is incompatible with Plantinga's foundationalism, or at least
with foundationalism as far as it relies on its traditional roots.
Foundationalism's traditional roots are, I believe, largely eviden
tialist concerns. Contrary to Plantinga's suggestion that evidential
ism grows out of foundationalism, foundationalism seems more
naturally understood to grow out of evidentialism, that is, to grow
out of the desire of the evidentialist to avoid arbitrariness, where
"arbitrariness" means, roughly, the claim that just any belief can be
properly basic (or, more broadly, normatively, epistemically justi
fied). If one is to avoid this arbitrariness, if one is to follow the
spirit of the evidentialist, then one approach is to be a founda
tionalist about justification. But I argue that PTpJ, and hence PTPh
is incompatible with Plantinga's foundationalist theory ofjustifica
tion insofar as it rests in the desire to avoid arbitrariness. This is so,
I argue, because of what I call the "universality challenge. "
The universality challenge is this: given an experience shared by
both theist and nontheist alike, nearly everyone will be led to form
a shared nontheistic (perceptual paradigm) belief, whereas only the
theist will be led to form a theistic belief. So, whereas both theist
and nontheist experience awe at the beauty of the universe, only
n

27. This challenge is a more rigorous form of one presented in Richard Grigg,
"Theism and Proper Basicality: A Response to Plantinga," International journal for
Philosophy of Religion 14 (1983): 123-27.
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the theist (and perhaps not even she in every instance) will form
a belief about God's creativity. Or perhaps more telling (because
avoiding potential problems with the aesthetic overtones of
"awe"), when both theist and nontheist experience a tree, both will
form the belief "I see a tree, " whereas only the theist will (some
times) form the belief that God made the tree. 28 The challenger
suggests that this universality of belief formation indicates the
firmly grounded nature of the perceptual paradigm beliefs, and
since the experience that generates the theistic belief does not pro
vide universality, it does not provide sufficient grounds for proper
basicality.
The motivation behind this challenge is broadly egalitarian in
spirit. The idea is that every fully rational human has certain belief
forming practices for producing justified beliefs. A general account
of these practices might be, roughly, that if some (cognitive) input
I is taken in by some fully rational person S, then S will form a
Uustified) belief p whose object is of kind K. For example, if Suzie
takes in the sensory input of tree-shapedness, then she will form
the justified belief that she sees a tree. The universality challenge
has the background assumption that all fully rational beings have
these practices and that, if one does have the practice, then one will
form the corresponding beliefs. As far as justified belief is con
cerned, all belief formations must be universal in this sense, includ
ing theistic belief formations. If one rejects this assumption, then
the universality challenge is not relevant to the parity thesis.
To flesh this assumption out somewhat, consider the following.
Suppose two people are looking through their home for some ob
ject, say, a particular copy of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. If both
were to enter the den, look toward the lower left corner of the
desk, epistemic equipment in full working order, and the copy of
Kant's first critique were lying on the desk in that area, would they
not both form the belief "there's the copy of Kant's Critique"? Not
clearly, and for many possible reasons. Person S1 may be distracted
28. To be exact, perhaps not everyone forms the belief "I see a tree. " Perhaps
one is not paying attention to one's experience or is distracted by the brilliance of
the green color and so does not form any belief. Nevertheless, when asked what it
is one is seeing, everyone, or nearly everyone with normal experiential equipment,
will say "I see a tree. " The theistic belief or description is not universal in this
sense. To simplify the discussion, I assume this account but refer simply to the
beliefs being formed.
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by something else on the desk, or by his concern that he is making
person S2 late for her class, having asked her to help him search.
But if S2 picks up the book, holds it in front of S1 's eyes, and says,
"here it is, " surely S1 will form the belief in question, or something
very close to it, or at least a belief that entails it. The point of the
egalitarian assumption is not that we form exactly the same beliefs
when given the same input, but that we are capable of forming a
belief about the kind of object providing the input, and, moreover,
that rational people typically do so. And the more fully rational
one is, the more likely one is to form beliefs that are in agreement
with other fully rational people. As far as we are fully rational, all
of us have the same doxastic tendencies. We all share, qua fully
rational people, the same objectification scheme for generating
justified beliefs. Finally, as far as one lacks these tendencies and
schemes, the fully rational person ought to be able to obtain them.
Another brief example. Suppose there is a glass of water in front
of S1 and S2• S1 forms the belief that the glass is half full, S2 that it
is half empty. There is a disagreement in the beliefs formed. But
presumably both would agree that one half the glass's capacity
contains water. It is the fully rational person's tendency to form
beliefs about a certain kind of object, given a certain input, that is
the egalitarian assumption's concern, not the details of what S1 or S2
focuses on. If it is a glass of water in front of them, and they are
concentrating on that rather than something else, they will form a
belief about the glass of water. Background beliefs and attitudes
may affect the details of the beliefs they generate, but the belief
will be a belief about the glass and water.
So, as the theist and nontheist stand in front of the majestic
mountains, both will form a belief about the mountains. Why do
they not both form beliefs about God's creative activity in the
mountains? Should they not both have the capacity to do so? And
if not, why not?
What grounds can be produced for denying or affirming what I
have been calling the "egalitarian assumption"? Kant assumed that
all rational creatures share the same intuitions of space and time
and the same categorical structures. Much like this, most epis
temologists assume that human minds work alike. In particular,
they assume that if we are all fully rational and all take in the same
cognitive input we will all form beliefs of the same kind, barring
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the typical epistemologist's standard special circumstances or dis
torting conditions (poor lighting and the like). The best argument
in the assumption's favor is that it seems to capture part of our
broad notion of rationality. Two rational persons, in a frame of
mind to concentrate on a given object, will, being rational, form a
belief about that object. If one does not, then, barring special dis
tractions or other excuses, one is rational and the other is not in
this instance. To be rational is to belong to a community of be
lievers who, given the full human capabilities, form similar beliefs
given similar inputs. The assumption thus allows for the possibility
of epistemological research; without the assumption, or some
broader assumption that includes it, there would be no reason to
think we can talk about human knowledge qua human. How could
we talk about whether a belief is rational, or rationally produced,
unless we assume that our cognitive practices deal with a given set
of data in the same way, at least in terms of output? If you can
excuse yourself from the requirements of rationality simply by say
ing that you do not have the doxastic mechanism needed to form a
given belief but yet still claim that you are fully rational, you can
get away with epistemic murder. Perhaps this is reason enough to
justify the assumption. Intuitively, at least, I am inclined to accept
the assumption, and I do not see any reason to reject it.
Some further explanatory notes on the universality challenge are
in order. First, it is important to understand that the universality
challenge does not depend on the theistic belief being generated by
an experience only the theist has. That would not count against the
proper basicality of the theistic belief any more than your not hav
ing the experience of the tree would count against my properly
basic belief that I see a tree, given my experience of the tree. Nei
ther can the challenge find a response simply in the claim that not
everyone objectifies experiences in theistic terms because one lacks
the disposition to do so, lacks the conceptual scheme that allows
one to do so, or, perhaps, simply lacks the ability to do so. The
challenge assumes that fully rational people do have the same basic
objectification schemes. One cannot lack the needed scheme qua
rational being. A comparison of the universality challenge to two
challenges suggested by Alston (see Chapter 2, Section 4) is helpful
in understanding the former. Alston writes that PP and CP differ
in that (1) the capacity for PP, and practice of it, is found univer-
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sally among normal adult human beings, and (2) all normal adult
human beings, whatever their culture, use basically the same con
ceptual scheme in objectifying their sense experience. Alston's re
sponse to these objections is that, although those kinds of univer
sality are interesting and comforting to us, they are not necessary
for reliability. This is shown by the fact that not everyone engages
in the practice of pure mathematics. But it is important to under
stand why it is true that not everyone engages in pure mathemat
ics. Here we must move beyond Alston's suggestions.
Does the mathematically inclined student, for example, have
some ability or means to objectify information in mathematical
terms that other students do not have? I think not. Even where we
speak of students not having mathematical ability, the students in
question typically have some ability. The ability shows up in de
grees. Although there are some who may not engage in the prac
tice, this is not because of a total lack of ability. Rather, those who
do not engage in the practice of pure mathematics, even at the
lowest levels, fail to do so simply because they have no need of it,
never thought about it, or have never been exposed to it. For those
of different cultures who do not engage in the practice, perhaps
their cultures have not developed the appropriate categories even
though in principle nothing stops individuals from so doing. The
slave boy in Plato's Meno is relevant here. At first he does not
engage in the practice of geometric reasoning, but he quickly
learns that he can. In short, two people one of whom engages in
the practice and one of whom does not should be said to differ
because the latter lacks the epistemic practice pragmatically al
though not in principle. I suggest that this lack is the result of the
fact that the one capable of engaging in the practice has the appro
priate input whereas the other does not have that input. This latter
case is comparable to people who have no theistic experience what
soever and hence do not generate theistic beliefs. But how do we
explain Plantinga's cases in which both theist and nontheist have
the same experiential input but only one forms a theistic belief?
It could be suggested that the difference is not in experience but
in conceptual schemes. The theist has a theistic conceptual scheme,
the nontheist does not-rather like the Meno's slave boy, who at
first does not have certain geometrical concepts but later does. But
surely the average atheist or agnostic has a noetic structure that
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contains the concept of God, in spite of all its supposed difficulties.
This raises all kinds of interesting and complex questions about the
relationships between experience and the conceptual schemes used
to understand or objectify them. Do experience and scheme arise
together? Can one have an experience without a conceptual
scheme? To what extent do conceptual schemes shape experience?
But we need not answer these questions in detail to understand the
thrust of the universality challenge. It is not that there are two
experiences or that there are two different conceptual schemes
working. The egalitarian assumption is that everyone, given the
same input, will generate (roughly) the same belief, or at least a
belief whose object is the same (kind of) thing. The challenge sug
gests, that is, that there is a close connection between the input of
an epistemic practice (the experience, in most cases) and the con
ceptual scheme used to objectify that input. Whenever a person
with normal epistemic practices takes in tree-shaped data, a tree
belief is generated. Or, as with Alston's case, the notion of theistic
objectification relies on an account of experience in which there is
some sort of theistic content (as I argued in Chapter 2). In the
experiences to which the universality challenge calls attention,
however, there is no theistic content per se. Rather, the emphasis is
on the shared but nontheistic nature of the experience and the con
ditions necessary to explain why the theist forms a theistic belief
but the nontheist does not. Since the experience is nontheistic,
it does not matter that the experiencer has a theistic conceptual
scheme. No theistic scheme of objectification will generate a theis
tic belief if there is no experience on which the scheme can work its
magic. How then does the theist legitimately generate her theistic
belief when the nontheist does not, given only a shared, nontheis
tic experience?
The assumption that the experiences are nontheistic in content
may appear to be unfair to Plantinga, but I think not. First of all,
many, if not most, of his examples appear to have the feature that
the experience is one that both theist and nontheist could share
looking at the flower, reading the Bible, feeling guilty. Second, an
important result from the criticism of PTA applies to Plantinga if
the experiences to which Plantinga calls attention are understood as
having a theistic content not shared by the nontheist. Such exam
ples fall prey to the background belief challenge. If the experiences
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allow for noninferential justification, it is not of the conceptual
reading but only of the noninferential mediated variety. Insofar as
the experiences are taken to be direct experiences of God, there is
nothing phenomenologically given in the experience that allows
one to say truly, "this is phenomenologically an experience of
God. " There must be background beliefs in the justification of the
belief that one's experience is an experience of God. These back
ground beliefs provide the mitigating circumstances that poten
tially weaken the level of justification of the theistic belief, since
these beliefs may themselves fail to have justification. Thus the an
tecedent conditions set out in PTPI or PTJ,h namely, that there are
no overriding conditions, may never be met. This in itself may
remove the possibility that theistic and perceptual paradigm beliefs
have the kind of parity suggested by PTJ,1. One does not use back
ground beliefs to form the perceptual paradigm beliefs, but one
does use them in the formation of beliefs about God. In the theistic
cases, as in, perhaps, any case dealing with epistemically unique
individuals, one may not have the strongest level of proper ba
sicality, for such beliefs involve a special role for beliefs as opposed
to concepts alone. In defending PTJ,h Plantinga cannot retreat to
unshared experiences with theistic content. Such experiences can
not be direct, conceptual-reading experiences of God, since back
ground beliefs are part of the epistemic conditions needed for justi
fication.
The universality challenge thus suggests that, when an exper
ience is shared by a theist and a nontheist, both should form
(roughly) the same beliefs, including theistic beliefs. If this does
not occur, then that fact needs explaining. It is not sufficient to
suggest that the theist has a practice by which she generates the
theistic belief whereas the nontheist does not have the practice, for,
by the egalitarian assumption, one should expect, given the same
(cognitive) input, that theist and nontheist should both form the
same belief. Of course, if the egalitarian assumption is false, then
the universality challenge is irrelevant. But then some other story
29

29. It will not do for Plantinga to make the content of the beliefs part of the
conceptual scheme as in hyper-Kantian category analogues for the reasons Forgie
rejects the hyper-Kantian understanding of mystical experiences (see Chapter 3,
Section 3). To do so vitiates the presumption of veridicality.
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needs to be told about how to keep a restraint on the formation of
any belief in any set of conditions and experiences whatsoever; ar
bitrariness knocks at the door. The egalitarian assumption provides
a kind of control over what can be legitimately taken as properly
basic; it is a backdrop assumption needed for the avoidance of arbi
trariness.
30

I have presented Plantinga's pos1t1on on rationality and the
proper basicality of beliefs about God. From this emerged his par
ity thesis. The universality challenge to this version of the parity
thesis suggests that Plantinga needs to explain why we do not all
generate the same beliefs, given the same experience. There are
several possibilities in this regard. In the next chapter I explain four
of them. Of these, the first three are unlikely candidates for giving
aid to Plantinga. The last, although a better candidate, leaves Plan
tioga with results that are less than sanguine.
30. There may, in fact, be other ways to provide the control needed, but the
egalitarian assumption is a place to begin, even if ultimately not correct. Alston· has
suggested to me, on several occasions, his own reluctance to admit that the egali
tarian assumption is correct.

